On the Judicialization of Health by Rutschman, Ana Santos
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 3 
2019 
On the Judicialization of Health 
Ana Santos Rutschman 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and 
Policy Commons, International Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Latin American Studies 
Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ana Santos Rutschman, On the Judicialization of Health, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 559 (2019), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
559 
ON THE JUDICIALIZATION OF HEALTH 
ANA SANTOS RUTSCHMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The provision of health care has long been at the forefront of domestic 
and international debates, philosophical inquiries, and political agendas. A 
growing body of legal scholarship has added to the debate by examining 
the role of judicial review in the context of health-related litigation. What 
role, if any, should courts play in compelling the provision of health care 
or in furthering access to potentially life-saving medicines? 
This question intersects with multiple strands of the law. For instance, 
it has an institutional component that interrogates the function(s) of courts 
within systems of checks and balances. It ties into constitutional design 
choices, as the right to health is expressly recognized by some national 
constitutions while others are silent on the matter. And, perhaps more 
fundamentally, it invites us to revisit our notions of fairness and 
distributive justice in a world of soaring drug and health care costs. 
Judge Santos’ timely piece, Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation,1 
richly interweaves constitutional law analysis and empirical data on 
health-related litigation in Brazil to ponder these issues. Brazil, it should 
be noted, is not only a country where the right to health is constitutionally 
protected,2 but also an epicenter of litigation surrounding socio-economic 
rights3 and one of the global leaders in the access to medicines movement.4 
In the Article, Judge Santos proposes that we look beyond what he 
calls “the American models of judicial activism or minimalism”5 when 
 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law Center for Health Law 
Studies & Center for International and Comparative Law; S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School. 
1  Pedro Felipe de Oliveira Santos, Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation: Designing Judicial 
Review to Control the Mis-Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 493 (2019). 
2  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 196 (Braz.) (“Health is the right of all 
and the duty of the National Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic policies 
aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and by universal and equal access to all 
activities and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”). 
3  See generally Mark Tushnet, Reflections on Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic 
Rights in the 21st Century, 4 NAT’L U. JURID. SCI. L. REV. 177 (2011). 
4  See ERIKA MALICH & SARAH MARION, CIGI, GRADUATE FELLOWS SERIES POLICY BRIEF 
NO. 2, INCREASING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: LEVERAGING BRAZIL’S EXPERIENCE (2015); see also 
Tatiana Chama Borges Luz et al., Trends in Medicines Procurement by the Brazilian Federal 
Government from 2006 to 2013, PLOS ONE, Apr. 7, 2017, at 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174616. 
5  Santos, supra note 1, at 533. 
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reflecting on the role that courts play or should play in interpreting and 
adjudicating health-related claims. Moreover, Judge Santos suggests that 
the Brazilian experience in this field might yield lessons that are relevant 
for other countries in the developing world.6 In the first half of this 
response, I have chosen to highlight aspects of the Article that speak to 
these two prongs, as they carry a special resonance in today’s debates on 
the provision of health goods and services. 
But I believe that Judge Santos is too modest in assessing the 
implications of his work and in connecting some of the topics covered in 
Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation to phenomena taking place well 
beyond the developing world. The second half of the response thus turns 
to parallels between some of the arguments put forth in the Article and 
selected aspects of health-related litigation in the United States. More 
broadly, I argue that Judge Santos’ Article advances both scholarship and 
overall awareness of the phenomenon of judicialization of health, which 
both encompasses and transcends localized manifestations of judicial 
review of health-based claims. 
II. HETEROEGENEITY OF RESPONSES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
The enforcement of socio-economic rights has been fraught with 
conceptual constraints and (mis)apprehensions, as thoroughly described in 
Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation. But it has also been fraught with 
practical constraints, even when courts take on a dynamic role7 in the case-
by-case application of socio-economic rights. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the resource-scarce jurisdictions of the developing world. 
In this Part, I highlight a few examples of these problems—not because 
they should deter the equality-enhancing function of courts as they operate 
in the socio-economic arena, but because they further Judge Santos’s point 
that courts in the developing world “must exercise creativity and 
institutional innovation”8 when deciding issues that involve socio-
economic rights. 
In exploring the role of courts as catalysts9 for the advancement of the 
right to health, Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation presents empirical 
data on litigation taking place in Brazil,10 but it also hints at similar 
 
 
6  Id. at 491.  
7  Id. at 476. See also generally David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1501 (2014). 
8  Santos, supra note 1, at 539.  
9  Id. at 476. See also Joanne Scott & Susan P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the 
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 4 (2007). 
10  Santos, supra note 1, at 507-11. See also João Biehl et al., The Judicialization of Health and 
the Quest for State Accountability: Evidence from 1,262 Lawsuits for Access to Medicines in Southern 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/11
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experiences in other countries.11 Looking elsewhere in the developing 
world, Judge Santos notes in passing12 a landmark case dealing with the 
right to health in South Africa, which I believe merits further 
contextualization, as it helps illustrate some of the practical hurdles 
surrounding the enforcement of the right to health. In Minister of Health v. 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a civil society organization 
successfully sued the government in 2002 for its failure to provide and 
implement programs to prevent child-to-mother transmission of HIV.13 
The claim was rooted in article 27(1)(a) of the South African Constitution, 
which establishes, inter alia, that “[e]veryone has the right to have access 
to health care services, including reproductive health care.”14 The 
Constitutional Court directed the government to make the anti-retroviral 
drug Nevirapine available to HIV-positive pregnant women and newborns 
of HIV-positive mothers.15 
The TAC case, as it became known, is often hailed as a pivotal moment 
in the history of judicial review and enforcement of socio-economic 
rights.16 Yet, several commentators have pointed out that the ruling of the 
Court in this case produced only limited welfare-enhancing gains: the 
program subsequently set up by the government to distribute Nevirapine 
reached only an estimated thirty percent of women who needed it.17 
TAC is part of a larger set of cases probing the boundaries of the right 
to health qua social right in South Africa. Another case that would be 
instructive to add to the examples considered by Judge Santos is 
Soobramoney, which dates from 1997 and involved a patient in need of 
dialysis.18 Thiagraj Soobramoney was refused treatment at a state hospital 
after being diagnosed as terminally ill and having exhausted his personal 
resources on private treatment. Mr. Soobramoney sued the government, 
relying on article 27(3) of the South Africa Constitution, which states that 
 
 
Brazil, 18 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 209 (2016). 
11  Santos, supra note 3, at 555.  
12  Id. at 432.  
13  See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
14  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 27. For a broader discussion on the enforcement of socio-
economic rights in South Africa’s recent constitutional history, see Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, 
Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African 
Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
15  Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 135. 
16  See generally Mark V. Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of 
Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813 (2003). 
17  Amy Kapczynski & Jonathan Berger, The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of 
Socio-Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 4 (Deena 
R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009). 
18  Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1997 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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“[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment,” in conjunction 
with article 11, which protects the right to life.19 The Durban High Court 
dismissed the claim, and the Constitutional Court upheld the decision. In a 
now often-quoted passage, the latter court reasoned that 
the obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in regard 
to access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are 
dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that 
the corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the 
lack of resources. Given this lack of resources and the significant 
demands on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified 
obligation to meet these needs would not presently be capable of 
being fulfilled. This is the context within which section 27(3) must 
be construed.20 
Soobramoney was the first case in which South Africa’s highest court 
dealt with socio-economic rights after the 1996 Constitution was adopted. 
In the opinion, the Court further noted that it would be “slow to interfere 
with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and 
medical authorities.”21  
TAC and Soobramoney embody distinguishable judicial approaches, to 
which commentators have dedicated numerous articles.22 Nevertheless, 
both cases speak to the perennial problems of resource scarcity, resource 
allocation and equitable access to health goods and services. Although at 
opposite ends of the spectrum, these cases illustrate how rationales of 
scarcity condition the right to health: in Soobramoney they inform the 
practice of judicial restraint, while in TAC they operate ex post, effectively 
curtailing the intervention of the court. 
On another level, both cases illuminate the often undertheorized 
relationship between courts and other institutional players engaged in the 
provision of goods typically associated with socio-economic rights. 
Soobramoney underscores the idea that courts operate in a continuum 
populated with differentiated actors. In some cases, the interests and 
policies that move these actors may be complementary, as showcased by 
 
 
19  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 27(3); 11. 
20  Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1997 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para. 11.  
21  Id. para. 29. 
22  See, e.g., Linda van Rensburg, Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights–Transforming South 
African Society? 1 POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 15 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Social and 
Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 124, 2001). See also Pierre de Vos, Grootboom, The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive 
Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 258 (2001) (further discussing the evolution 
of the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/11
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the deference given by the South African Constitutional Court to 
democratically elected institutions, as well as to the institutions that are 
arguably the leaders in the provision of health care—hospitals. On the 
other hand, the shortcomings of the implementation of TAC remind us that 
other types of actors and interventions are needed to create and maintain 
effective health systems. Despite the de facto hurdles in implementing 
TAC, the concerted efforts of a civil society organization produced a legal 
outcome that solidifies the justiciability of the right to health, and—at least 
to some extent—of socio-economic rights in general. 
Soobramoney and TAC are but two illustrations of the constraints that 
surround the judicial and extra-judicial implementation of the right to 
health. They share many of the features that we encounter in Judge Santos’ 
narrative about the asymmetrical implementation of socio-economic 
rights23 and the dialogical relationship that Brazilian courts ruling on 
health-related matters maintain with the larger institutional ecosystem, 
however fragmentarily.24  
Nonetheless, I would also argue that they serve as cautionary notes as 
to how transposable lessons extracted from a particular country experience 
might be. Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation suggests that the Brazilian 
case study may yield valuable lessons to developing countries with 
economic profiles that are perceived as being somewhat similar to 
Brazil’s: the Article specifically names South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, 
Colombia and India as possible future testing grounds for Judge Santos’ 
frameworks. While I wholeheartedly embrace Judge Santos’ call for richer 
comparative work in this field, I believe it is equally important to stress 
the heterogeneity of experiences in discrete legal, social and political 
systems within the developing world. 
Take the case of the tutela action in Colombia, a procedural mechanism 
created in the 1990s to enable individuals to bring claims rooted in the 
violation of constitutionally protected rights.25 The tutela pathway became 
especially appealing in health-related litigation and was used extensively 
by private citizens to request the provision of medicines not covered by 
the national Mandatory Health Plan.26 However, the exponential spread of 
 
 
23  Santos, supra note 1, at 514.  
24  Id. at 463-64 (noting that “Brazilian scholars denounce the fact that judges have guided the 
health care programs; however, from time to time, the government expands the list of services and 
drugs provided by the public system regarding the contents of the rulings delivered by courts, such as 
in the HIV/AIDS case.”).  
25  For a description of the development of the tutela action in Colombia, see David Landau, The 
Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 205-207 (2012). 
26  See Katharine G. Young & Julieta Lemaitre, The Comparative Fortunes of the Right to 
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litigation through tutelas ultimately posed severe strains on the judicial 
review of health-based claims:27 first, by greatly increasing the workload 
of courts;28 and second, by being linked to the escalating costs of health-
related litigation, which skyrocketed from USD 1.48 million in 2001 to 
USD 344 million in 2008.29  
Of course, this phenomenon alone does not caution against the 
adoption of mechanisms that impose greater demands on the time and 
resources of courts, or that increase health-centric litigation in general. But 
it is worth keeping this and other examples30 in mind as different legal 
systems in different countries move to accommodate the demands of 
socio-economic litigation, and as scholars and policy reflect on the 
ramifications of the justiciability of health rights.  
These caveats are nonetheless compatible with the spirit in which 
Judge Santos wrote Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation. Without 
explicitly using this formulation, the Article continuously entreats courts 
in Brazil not to adopt one-size-fits-all models of judicial review. Judge 
Santos’ careful approach to themes so closely related to his professional 
and scholarly endeavors indicate that he would also caution against one-
size-fits-all transplants of the Brazilian experience. 
The Article invites readers to (re)visit the boundaries of comparative 
constitutional law and health care systems in the developing world. While 
my response has so far engaged with one sliver of that universe, I now 
briefly turn in the opposite—but complementary—direction.  
III. BRINGING IT HOME: JUDICIALIZATION OF 
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Symposium in which Judge Santos discussed his Article on 
February 19, 2019 was entitled The Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights 
in Dysfunctional Democracies. This response is not the appropriate venue 
to characterize the present state of democratic institutions in the United 
 
 
Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 179 (2013). 
27  Everaldo Lamprea & Tatiana Andia, Local Maladies, Global Remedies: Rethinking Right to 
Health Duties 1 (2008) (unpublished), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252068548.  
28  Alicia Ely Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, How Do Courts Set Health Policy? The Case of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, 6 PLOS MED. 147 (Feb. 7, 2006), 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000032. 
29  Lamprea & Andia, supra note 27, at 6. It should be noted that, while the use of the tutela 
action was tied to escalating economic costs of health-related litigation, tutelas alone were not 
responsible for the entirety of the cost of health-related litigation. Id. at 15-16 (noting that Colombia 
also had some of the most expensive pharmaceuticals at the time). 
30  See, e.g., Olman Rodríguez Loaiza et al., Revisiting Health Rights Litigation and Access to 
Medications in Costa Rica: Preliminary Evidence from the Cochrane Collaboration Reform, 20 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 79 (June 2018) (analyzing judicial review of health claims in Costa Rica). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/11
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States. What I would like to emphasize here is that there are relevant 
points of contact between the debate surrounding the role of courts in 
health-related litigation in the developing world and ongoing events in the 
United States.  
Judge Santos’ ultimate quest is to investigate “how courts may produce 
more justice in socio-economic-rights-related litigation.”31 If nothing else, 
this question should encourage debate in developing and developed 
countries alike. At a more specific level, however, many of the elements 
upon which Judge Santos touches in Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation 
directly relate to issues we are currently facing in the United States. 
Because Judge Santos spends significant parts of the Article critiquing 
the reductionist view embodied by what he calls the “American models of 
judicial activism or minimalism,”32 I will leave aside the question of 
whether and to what extent American courts should be involved in health-
related litigation. But I will outline a few possible avenues of inquiry that 
highlight how American courts have been involved in health-related 
litigation. 
I will start by addressing one aspect related to the (in)existence of a 
right to health in the United States. Unlike Brazil and several other 
countries, the United States Constitution does not enshrine socio-economic 
rights.33 Without delving into the many implications of this omission, it is 
worth noting that the absence of a federal right to health is not 
synonymous with American courts not having to engage in 
considerations—or, more to the point, in the application of laws and 
doctrines—that directly or indirectly affect the provision of health goods 
and services.34 Rather, in the United States we have a web of constitutional 
provisions, ad hoc federal legislation, state laws, case law, and regulations 
that continually require courts to play a dynamic role that decisively 
shapes most aspects of the provision of health care, access to medicines, 
and health equity in America.  
Against this backdrop, substantive American health law35 is 
intrinsically tied to the work of courts operating within this legal and 
 
 
31  Santos, supra note 1, at 535.  
32  Id. at 469.  
33  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273 
(1990) (describing and critiquing the historical view of the United States Constitution as a “charter of 
negative liberties.”). 
34  To give but one example, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See also Jack M. Beermann, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Right to 
Health Care: Government's Obligation to Provide for the Health, Safety and Welfare of Its Citizens, 
18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 277 (2015). 
35  And, I would add, large segments of health policy. 
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normative patchwork. Health is largely judicialized in the United States. 
Most of the literature overtly investigating the judicialization of health 
comes from scholars in the developing world,36 but America might just 
have the grandest of natural experiments in this field. 
Given the plethora of legal instruments, as well as the breadth of 
institutions and actors involved in health law and policy in the United 
States, Judge Santos’ remark that “courts must exercise creativity and 
institutional innovation”37 in health-related litigation could well have been 
addressed to American courts. Likewise, the Article’s framing of Brazilian 
courts as steeped in a complex institutional ecosystem reminds us that 
courts do not decide health-related issues in a legal and policy vacuum. 
Mutatis mutandis, the relational perspective adopted by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney case underscores this idea.38 
The second point that I would like to make in connection with Judge 
Santos’ article relates to the fact that, while we do not have a federal right 
to health in the United States, we certainly do have state constitutions in 
which there is a recognition or quasi-recognition of a state right to health. 
For instance, since 1963, section 51 of article IV of the Michigan 
Constitution has established that “[t]he public health and general welfare 
of the people of the state are hereby declared to be matters of primary 
public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection 
and promotion of the public health.”39 
One could be tempted to read the letter of the law as to imply that the 
state of Michigan has a right to health that mirrors the one enshrined in the 
1988 Brazilian Constitution,40 or in any other national constitutional laws 
that have adopted a positive right to health. But, as Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard has noted, Michigan courts have interpreted section 51 in a way 
that “does not create and, in fact, seems to negate, any enforceable claim 
with respect to state action or inaction.”41 For example, in Michigan 
Universal Health Care Action Network v. State,42 several advocacy groups 
 
 
36  See, e.g., Biehl et al., supra note 10. 
37  Santos, supra note 1, at 539.  
38  See supra Part II.  
39  MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51. 
40  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 196 (Braz.) (“Health is the right of all 
and the duty of the National Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic policies 
aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and by universal and equal access to all 
activities and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”); cf. Santos, supra note 1, at 437 
(emphasizing the positive constitutional dimension of the right to health in Brazil).  
41  Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1325, 1350 (2010). 
42  Mich. Universal Health Care Action Network v. Michigan, No. 261400, 2005 WL 3116595 
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005) (per curiam). 
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representing uninsured and underinsured Michigan citizens brought a 
lawsuit to compel the state to establish a Michigan-wide health care plan.43 
Even though section 51 contains mandatory language, 44 “the court 
concluded that the provision did not ‘require the state to provide state-
funded health care coverage.’”45 
Leaving aside the interpretive history of state constitutional language 
on the right to health,46 as well as ingrained constitutional traditions 
outside the scope of this response,47 let us consider Beyond Minimalism 
and Usurpation’s invitation to look for solutions that might disrupt the 
status quo. Are courts correct in reading language like “the legislature 
shall pass…” as enabling rather than mandatory? Must interpreters of 
American law operate on a negative-positive right constitutional 
dichotomy, rather than a spectrum where both types of rights may coexist 
in meaningful ways? Or even more broadly: is there something 
fundamentally different about patient populations in the United States that 
keeps us from breaking the mold of long-held traditions? And if the 
answers (or parts thereof) to these questions are so intimately connected to 
our constitutional interpretive practices and traditions, are these practices 
and traditions necessarily welfare-enhancing and hence worth 
maintaining? 
The context in which these questions arise is far removed from South 
Africa’s TAC case example. However, the interplay between the role of 
courts, democratic institutions and civil society should prompt us to ask 
fundamental questions that are the core of democracy, whether we find 
ourselves in a functional or dysfunctional one. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This two-part response has surveyed some of the ways in which courts 
are involved in health-related litigation and how the work done by courts 
affects the right to health, when it is constitutionally recognized and when 
it is not. In my reading of Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation, I have 
sought to advance the point that the judicialization of health is pluriform. I 
read Judge Santos’ work as an ample invitation to reflect and to enrich 
academic and non-academic discourses on the role of courts in health-
 
 
43  Weeks Leonard, supra note 41, at 1349. 
44  “The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public 
health.” MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51. 
45  Weeks Leonard, supra note 41, at 1349 (quoting Mich. Universal Health Care Action 
Network, 2005 WL 3116595, at *2) (internal citation added).   
46  See generally Weeks Leonard, supra note 41. 
47  See Bandes, supra note 33. 
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related litigation. The United States is certainly among the countries where 
such a reflection is most urgent. 
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